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1 Introduction
Job mobility is an important determinant of lifetime wage growth. Topel and Ward (1992)
suggest that job mobility accounts for one third of overall wage growth in the early stages
of the working career. However, the e®ect of a job change on the wage growth remains
an open issue. Some theories predict a positive e®ect, others a negative one. Empirical
research has failed to resolve this debate since it has produced contradictory ¯ndings (see
section 2). In all these studies, however, the e®ect of a job change on wage growth is
assumed to be independent of the position in the wage distribution. This assumption is
questionable since on-the-job search theory suggests that the decision of a worker to change
job is contingent on the level of the initial wage. More speci¯cally, on-the-job search theory
suggests that both the hazard rate of leaving the current job and the di®erence between
the current wage and the reservation wage decrease with the current wage (Mortensen,
1986; van den Berg, 1992). A low-paid worker expects more job changes in his working
life than a high-paid worker in order to improve his earnings. Therefore, compared to a
high-paid worker, a low-paid worker chooses a reservation wage that is relatively higher
than the current wage (van den Berg, 1992). In this way, the low-paid worker reduces the
costs related to the job change, as he can attain his preferred life-time earnings level in a
fewer number of steps. If workers receive wage o®ers relatively close to their reservation
wage, then the wage gains from a job change are relatively higher for the low-paid than
for the high-paid worker. Therefore, distinguishing between the di®erent parts of the wage
distribution can resolve the ambiguity of the e®ect of a job change on wage growth.
Workers' characteristics have been shown to a®ect their likelihood of voluntary and
involuntary job mobility (Jung & Winkelmann, 1993). The type of job change - within
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the ¯rm or with another employer - is also relevant for the di®erences between low-paid
and high-paid workers. According to various theories, wage careers within ¯rms deviate
from the assumptions of the fully competitive labour market model. Employers in large
¯rms often pay a wage above the market wage, in order to retain the most productive
workers. Therefore, on average, we would expect positive returns due to job changes in the
internal labour market. However, since high-paid workers are more involved in training and
therefore develop more ¯rm-speci¯c skills (Arulampalam et al., 2004), they are expected
to derive more utility than low-paid workers from a promotion or a job shift within the
same ¯rm.
The aim of this paper is to compare the e®ect of a voluntary job change on wage growth
for the low-paid and the high-paid worker, accounting for the di®erent mechanisms driving
them to change jobs, and di®erentiating between external and in-¯rm job changes. We
de¯ne as low-paid the workers belonging to the lowest quartile of the wage distribution
and as high-paid workers those belonging to the highest quartile of the wage distribution.
From a policy perspective, this is an important issue as the demand for low-skilled/low-
paid employment has considerably decreased over the past decades (Acemoglu, 2003).
Moreover, the creation of jobs of a given quality and earnings level (i.e. high-level jobs)
is considered to be a signi¯cant policy tool to tackle earnings inequality within European
labour markets (Salverda et al., 2001).
Another novel aspect of this study is that it investigates the costs and bene¯ts related to
a job change in a cross-country comparative perspective. These costs and bene¯ts are not
uniform across countries, since they can be in°uenced by labour market institutions. More
speci¯cally, in the presence of strong wage regulation - due to collective bargaining or a
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national minimum wage - downward wage adjustments will be rather rare at the bottom of
the earnings distribution, but not necessarily at the top. Furthermore, in countries where
jobs are closely linked to educational quali¯cations, a change of employer will mean fewer
costs being incurred by a worker who invests in ¯rm-speci¯c skills. Such a worker is more
often a high-paid worker than a low-paid worker. Therefore, the analysis is performed in
two countries: in Germany where all of the above-mentioned institutional characteristics
prevail, and in the UK, where these characteristics are absent.
Investigating the e®ect of job mobility on wage growth entails several methodological
complications. The most important one is the endogeneity of job mobility. The wage is
not only dependent on a job change, it is also a determinant of it (Topel & Ward, 1992;
Le Grand & Tº ahlin, 2002). To tackle this endogeneity, we apply a two-step approach of
the Heckman type. In a ¯rst step, we model job mobility with a panel multinomial logit
model. In a second step, we use the predicted probabilities derived from the ¯rst step to
control for endogeneity in a panel wage-growth equation. The interesting feature of our
approach is that we control for unobserved heterogeneity in both steps of the estimation
procedure.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the ¯ndings
of the relevant literature. The role of the institutional framework is explained in section
3. The econometric model is developed and explained in Section 4. The data used in our
analysis are discussed in Section 5. Some descriptive results are reported in Section 6.
Section 7 reports on the results from the two-step estimation of the e®ect of job mobility
on wage growth. Conclusions are drawn in Section 8.
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2 The link between wage mobility and job change
Several theories attempt to establish a link between job turnover and wage dynamics.
Four main approaches can be identi¯ed in the standard economic theory: the movers-
stayers approach, the job-search approach, the job-matching approach, and the human
capital approach.
The movers-stayers model of Blumen et al. (1955) is rooted in psychology. In this
model, some workers are expected to be more likely to move than others. This instability
is assumed to lower productivity, and thereby to reduce the wage of movers below the wage
of stayers.
The job-search model (Burdett, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979b; Mortensen, 1986) predicts
a positive e®ect of job mobility on wages. According to this model, workers enter the
labour market with a given and ¯xed stock of human capital. Firms di®er in the level of
productivity they can extract from the workers. Hence, workers' productivity depends on
the ¯rm they are employed in. Employed workers are assumed to continue searching for
a ¯rm in which they will be more productive. As a result, job mobility will a®ect wage
growth positively.
In both the movers-stayers model and the job-search model, productivity is assumed
to be ¯xed and known ex-ante. Therefore, these two models suggest that controlling
for individual and job heterogeneity eliminates the e®ect of job mobility on wages. This
prediction is not supported by longitudinal empirical research. A series of studies, such as
those conducted by Light and McGarry (1998) and Munasinghe and Sigman (2004), ¯nds
that job mobility has an e®ect on wages even after controlling for observed and unobserved
personal and job characteristics. In general, voluntary employer changes are associated
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with wage gains in the US (Royalty, 1998; Gladden & Taber, 2000) and in Europe (Davia,
2005; Perez & Sanz, 2005). Black (1980) suggests that the positive wage gains are higher
when on-the-job search precedes a voluntary job change. However, these gains decrease
with age as well as with tenure and with the number of job changes (Jovanovic, 1979b;
Blau & Kahn, 1981; Bartel & Borjas, 1981; Topel & Ward, 1992; Farber, 1994; Light &
McGarry, 1998; Dustmann & Meghir, 2005).
The matching model (Jovanovic, 1979a) has a dynamic approach as it allows for both
within-jobs wage growth as well as between-jobs wage growth. According to this model,
the worker's productivity, although ¯xed, is unknown ex-ante to employers. Therefore, jobs
are considered as `pure experience goods'. In other words, there is initially an uncertainty
about the worker's productivity. As job tenure increases, the employer gains additional
information about the actual productivity of the worker. Due to this learning e®ect, wages
grow also within jobs. Wages can also grow due to job changes, as a reward for searching for
more e±cient job matches. Due to the initial uncertainty about the worker's productivity,
this approach allows for an e®ect of job mobility on wage growth even after correcting for
personal and job characteristics. However, employers may interpret frequent job changes
as a signal for poor productivity. Hence, frequent job mobility may reduce future wage
prospects. A contradicting approach stems from Lazear (1986). In his `raiding' model,
Lazaer suggests that ¯rms compete for high-quality workers. For this reason, job movers
are workers with high skills and high quality, and job mobility has a positive e®ect on wage
growth.
According to human capital theory (Becker, 1962), productivity is largely determined
by ¯rm-speci¯c human capital. Job mobility is strongly related to investments in speci¯c
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human capital. Returns to job mobility depend on the transferability of speci¯c human
capital across jobs. The more speci¯c human capital can be transferred, the smaller the
wage loss will be due to a job change. Therefore, human capital theory does not provide
clear predictions about the wage di®erences between movers and stayers. Mincer (1986,
1988) ¯nds evidence that, although movers gain from changing a job, stayers experience a
higher wage growth as they invest more in speci¯c human capital in the form of getting
involved in job training.
The e®ect of within-¯rm job changes has received much less attention in economics,
whereas within-¯rm mobility is found to account for a considerable part of the life cycle
earnings variation (McCue, 1996). E±ciency wage theory suggests that employers of large
¯rms motivate their employees by o®ering them wages above the market rates. According
to this theory, then, we would expect positive returns of within-¯rm job changes (see, for
example, Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984; Akerlof & Yellen, 1986).1 Empirical studies, however,
provide contradicting evidence. Lazaer (1999) argues that promotions have an immediate
positive e®ect on wages. Booth et al. (2003) quantify this e®ect to 5% for the British
workers. However, Hannan et al. (1990) ¯nd that within-¯rm job mobility does not result
in faster wage growth for West German workers, while Baker et al. (1994) ¯nd that the
wage premium of an in-¯rm promotion in the US is signi¯cantly less than the average wage
disparity between the same job positions.
The predictions of economic theory on the di®erences in the wage returns of a job
change between low-paid and high-paid workers have remained largely unexplored. The
1All the above-mentioned approaches assume that job turnover is voluntary and direct (job-to-job).
Involuntary mobility and mobility through unemployment is associated with loss of speci¯c human capital
and therefore result in slowed wage careers. In this paper, however, we restrict our analysis to job-to-job
transitions.
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basic job search model of Mortensen (1986) shows that the the instantaneous quit rate
declines with the current wage. van den Berg (1992) goes one step further. He predicts a
relationship between the wage returns of a job change and the level of the current wage by
deriving a numerical approximation of the reservation wage. His derived formula for the
reservation wage is:
»(w) = w +
r + '(w)
1 ¡ c0(w)'(w)
c(w) + o(c(w)); (1)
for every w²[0; ¹ w].
The term o(c(w)) can be neglected as dt ¡! 0. w is the current wage and ¹ w is a
number 0 < ¹ w < +1. ¸ is the job o®er arrival rate in a Poisson process, '(w) is the
hazard rate of leaving the current job and c(w) represents the search costs.2
Equation 1 suggests that the gap between the reservation wage and the current wage,
»(w) ¡ w, is a decreasing function of the current wage. This result is quite plausible: a
low-paid worker needs a larger relative increase of his income in order to change job than
his high-paid colleague. This is because the low-paid worker expects many job changes in
order to reach a higher earnings level. Therefore, he wants to minimize the search costs
that he will pay, and he sets his reservation wage relatively higher than his current wage
2The approximation of »(w) is done by van den Berg with a Taylor series around c(w) = 0. The
following assumptions hold:
1. 0 < ¸ < +1.
2. The job o®ers are random draws from a wage o®er distribution F(x). F(x) is a strictly increasing
di®erential function on [0; ¹ w], where ¹ w is a number 0 < ¹ w < +1. For x · 0, F(x) = 0, while for
x ¸ ¹ w, F(x) = 1. Further 0 < w · ¹ w.
3. c(w) is a continuously di®erentiable function on [0; ¹ w].
4. For each w²(0; ¹ w], c0(w) < 1=¸.
Assumption 4 means actually that c(w) increases only slowly, as a function of w.
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than his higher-paid colleague. Since it is reasonable to assume that both the cost of job
search and the rate of change in the cost of job search is higher in the external than in
the internal labour market this gap between the reservation wage and the current wage
decreases faster with the wage in the external labour market than in the internal labour
market.
3 The role of the institutions
The two countries - UK and Germany - included in this study present important di®erences
with respect to their labour market institutions. In fact, they are often perceived as
di®erent worlds of labour and as each other's opposites within Europe. The liberal British
labour market is characterized by low levels of job protection through public regulation.
E±ciency in the British labour market is achieved through a high level of labour market
mobility and job turnover. Government intervention is reduced to a minimum, and the
extent and impact of collective bargaining is rather limited (only 22% in the private sector).
Minimum wage regulation was been absent from 1993 until 1999, when a national minimum
wage was introduced. Wage inequality is much higher in the UK than in Germany; the
D9/D1 ratio (the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile of the wage distribution) in 1996
was 4.14 compared to 2.67 for Germany (Salverda et al., 2001).
Compared to the UK, the German labour market is characterized by a high level of
job protection through public law and an extended system of collective bargaining. Even
the wages of the upper middle-class workers are set by collective employment agreements.
Minimum pay regulation is determined at both the sectoral level and the regional level.
Speci¯cally, collective bargaining covers about 70% of the West German workers in the pri-
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vate sector. Jobs are closely linked to educational credentials, which are acquired through
formal education and apprenticeship. Apprenticeship lasts for a period of up to three years
and many young people go through it. Furthermore, employers are directly involved in the
provision and delivery of apprenticeships (Hannan et al. 1997). Thus, apprenticeships are
aimed at developing skills that are transferable across jobs and employers (Winkelmann,
1996). This strengthens the position of workers who change jobs. As a result, in Germany
we expect to ¯nd smaller di®erences between internal (within-¯rm) job moves and exter-
nal job moves, as skills are more transferable across employers. In the UK, on the other
hand, job-speci¯c skills, acquired in the internal labour market, are more important. Since
educational quali¯cations act more as a signal or a screening device for learning about the
ability of the worker's potential to acquire these skills, job movers may su®er from a severe
loss of human capital.
The macroeconomic performance of the two countries also shows considerable variation
since the early 1990s. The UK was engaged in a considerably stronger economic upturn
than Germany. The average annual GDP growth rate in the UK was twice that of Germany
in the period 1991-2004 (2.8 and 1.4 percent respectively). The average labour productiv-
ity (for the years 1992-2004), in the UK, measured in GDP per hours worked was 2.58,
whereas it was only 1.97 in Germany. The male unemployment rate in the UK dropped
sharply from 12.1 percent in 1993 to 5.5 percent in 2003, while in Germany it increased
from 5.9 percent to 8.7 percent in the same time period. Male labour force participation
rates remained stable between 1991-2004 in the UK (79.6% and 78.9% respectively), but
decreased considerably in Germany (77.6% and 71% respectively).3 Consequently, we ex-
pect to ¯nd higher returns to job mobility for the British workers than for the German
3All the data in this paragraph come from OECD (2006).
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workers.
4 The two-step Heckman empirical model
We aim at investigating the wage returns to job mobility in the di®erent parts of the
wage distribution. This is done by modelling the year-to-year relative wage growth of
individuals. Let wit be the natural logarithm of the wage of the individual i in the time
period t. Consider the following standard panel wage equation that includes job mobility
as one of the predictors:













+ ui + "it ; (2)
where xit is a vector of covariates including a constant term (see note in Table 2). pijt is
an indicator variable representing the position in the wage distribution and taking one of
the two values 0 or 1. The index j = 0;1;2 corresponds to low-paid, medium-paid and
high-paid, respectively. The categorical variable for the job change appears in the equation
as dummies (dik(t+1)) indicating whether a change of employer or job change within the
¯rm takes place between t and t+1 (di1(t+1) = 1 for an external job change and di2(t+1) = 1
for an in-¯rm job change). If we restrict cjk = ck we get a simpler model, in which the
e®ect of the job change is independent of the position in the wage distribution. To capture
the di®erentiating e®ect of the job change in the various parts of the wage distribution,
we interact the dummies for the job change with the dummies for the position in the
distribution. For identi¯cation, we assume that b0 = 0 and cj0 = 0. The term ui represents
the individual-speci¯c unobserved ¯xed e®ects and "it the idiosyncratic error. The term
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"it is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and uncorrelated with ui.
Clearly, the issue of initial conditions emerges in our analysis. This means that the
group of individuals that is in a certain pay level at a given point in time may be en-
dogenous. However, controlling for initial conditions in a panel model is rather di±cult
and thus left as an issue for further research. By controlling for observed and unobserved
heterogeneity we are able to control at least partly for the possible endogeneity of initial
conditions.
Furthermore, in this study we focus on another problem of endogeneity: the endogeneity
of the job change. There are two potential sources for endogeneity. The ¯rst is reverse
causality; the decision of a worker to change job may be caused by the expectation of a
higher wage-growth in the new job. Munasinghe (2000) suggests, accordingly, that high
wage-growth jobs are less likely to end than low wage growth jobs. Secondly, there may be
unobserved factors such as ability and e®ort a®ecting both the wage and the decision of a
worker to change jobs. Both sources of endogeneity might lead to bias in the parameter
estimates.
The estimation of equation 2 involves a panel model with a continuous dependent vari-
able and a categorical endogenous predictor (for changes of employer and for job changes
with the same employer). In a cross sectional framework, endogeneity is usually tackled
by the approach introduced by Heckman (1978, 1979) and developed further by others,
such as Vella and Verbeek (1999). Other approaches, such as the endogenous switching
model used by Perez and Sanz (2005) provide a better estimate of the e®ect of job mobility
on wages, but fail to control for unobserved personal characteristics. Our approach is to
employ a two-step procedure of the Heckman type in a panel framework, applying correc-
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tion for unobserved heterogeneity: ¯rst, we model the probability of job mobility; second,
we estimate a wage regression that includes the correction terms for endogeneity that are
derived from the ¯rst step.
In order to respect the panel structure of our sample in the ¯rst step, we apply a
random-e®ects multinomial logit model for job mobility, distinguishing between no job
change, external job change, and within-¯rm job change. The multinomial logit model has
been criticized for producing biased estimates when the assumption of the Independent
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) is violated. However, Bourguignon et al. (2007) argue that the
multinomial logit model can be trusted in the ¯rst step of a cross-sectional selection model
when the propensity scores are transformed in a certain way before being used as controls
for endogeneity in the second step of the estimation procedure. The transformation they
suggest is based on the approach of Dubin and McFadden (1984). We use non-pay related
components of job satisfaction as the exclusive variables that allow the identi¯cation of the
model. For the UK, we use the satisfaction with working hours and with the work content.
For Germany, we use the variable indicating how much the worker is worried about job
security. We also tested other instruments, such as the housing tenure status. The results
we obtained were similar. The components of job satisfaction that are used as exclusive
instruments are not in°uenced by the satisfaction for the wage. The overall job satisfaction
would be inappropriate as exclusive variable as it is correlated with the wage (see, among
others, Clark, 1999). This correlation, however, is produced mainly by the satisfaction for
the wage. In BHPS, respondents are asked to report their satisfaction for pay, working
hours, work content, as well as their overall job satisfaction. In GSOEP, respondents are
asked to report their overall job satisfaction, and their worry about job security. Thus, we
can safely assume that our exclusive variables are uncorrelated with wage growth.
12Who bene¯ts from a job change: the dwarfs or the giants?
The probability that worker i makes a job change k at time point t, conditional on
observed characteristics zit and unobserved characteristics ¹is can be written as follows:









where zit is a vector of covariates including human capital and job characteristics. zit also
includes a vector of intercepts. k represents the three destination states: remaining in
the same job, moving to another job outside the ¯rm, and changing job with the same
employer. Parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood using LatentGold (Vermunt
& Magidson, 2007). The likelihood contribution of an individual i is the joint probability
















1 if dit is observed in time period t
0 otherwise
: (6)
We use this model to estimate the probability of a job change with another employer
³
^ P (di1t = 1)
´
and the probability of a job change with the same employer
³
^ P (di2t = 1)
´
.
Note that the unobserved individual e®ects (¹is) are speci¯c for each destination state s.
They follow the normal distribution with variance §¹, ¹is » N(0;§¹). For the identi¯ca-
tion of the model we assume that ¹i0 = 0. In the variance-covariance matrix §¹, we also
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impose the restrictions:
¾11 = (À1)2, ¾22 = (À2)2
and ¾12 = ¾21 = (À1 ¤ À2)
Therefore, the variance-covariance matrix §¹ of the random e®ects has the structure
(Vermunt et al., 2008):
§¹ =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
0 0 0
0 (À1)2 (À1 ¤ À2)
0 (À1 ¤ À2) (À2)2
9
> > > > > =
> > > > > ;
(7)
The second step of the estimation procedure is a ¯xed-e®ects linear wage regression. The
Hausman test rejects the null assumption of the joint coe±cients' equality of the ¯xed-
e®ects and random-e®ects model, suggesting that the ¯xed-e®ects speci¯cation should be
preferred. The inverse Mills ratios (¸1 and ¸2), derived from the ¯rst step, are used as
controls for endogeneity. For computing the inverse Mills ratios we use the speci¯cation of






^ Pj ln ^ Pj
1 ¡ ^ Pj
¡ ln ^ Ps
!
; (8)
where ^ Ps = ^ P (dikt = 1). For a particular individual, this is the expected posterior mean
of this probability. The dependent variable is the year-to-year wage growth wit+1 ¡ wit.
The wage regression can be written as follows:


















r + ui + "it : (9)
where wit is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage and x0
it is a vector of covariates. "it
is the idiosyncratic error, while ui represents unobserved individual speci¯c characteristics.
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The vector ¯ and the scalars bj, cjk, ±0
1 and ±0
2 are the regression parameters to be estimated.
5 Data and main concepts
Our data cover the period 1991-2004 and originate from two national panel datasets. For
the UK, we use the BHPS - British Household Panel Survey (Taylor et al., 2006), which
contains information on labour market participation and income of approximately 10,000
individuals per wave aged 16 years or above. For Germany, we use the GSOEP - German
Socio-economic Panel (Wagner et al., 1993), which covers about 13,000 individuals aged
16 years or above. Waves 8-21 are used, which refer to the period 1991-2004. We only
use data for the former West Germany as the labour market of East Germany di®ered
considerably from that of the West Germany, especially at the beginning of the 1990s. The
information from the two datasets has been made highly comparable for the purpose of
this study.
The sample is restricted to full-time working males between 25 and 55 years of age.
Speci¯cally, we select males that declared paid employment as their main activity and
who work at least 35 hours a week. We exclude the self-employed and the apprentices.
Our main economic variable is the gross hourly wage. This hourly wage is calculated
from the previous month's earnings from paid employment, and the usual number of hours
worked per week. Monthly pay includes overtime but no other kind of additional payments.
Including additional payments, such as bonuses and fringe bene¯ts, would certainly be
informative since the high-paid might receive more of these payments than the low-paid.
However, in GSOEP, information on these payments is only available on a yearly basis and
therefore it does not necessarily refer to the current job. Unfortunately, these panel surveys
o®er no information on the reservation wage so we are assuming that the workers accept
job o®ers with a wage close to their reservation wage. We de¯ne as low-paid and high-paid
workers those belonging to the lowest and the highest quartile of the wage distribution,
respectively. We should stress here that there is no widely agreed threshold for high
pay. This threshold is sometimes de¯ned in terms of the median wage (e.g. 1.5 times
the median wage) or in terms of quartiles or deciles. A caveat is always involved when
comparing countries with very di®erent wage distributions. Setting the high-pay threshold
to 1.5 times the median wage would result in having very di®erent population proportions
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for the various countries, while choosing the fourth quartile as the threshold implies that
workers included in di®erent country samples vary a lot with respect to the proportion of
the median wage they earn.
Following similar approaches in the literature (Perez & Sanz, 2005), we de¯ne as vol-
untary, a job change that is direct, i.e. without any intervening spell of unemployment
or inactivity. Since our focus is on voluntary separations, involuntary job changes are
excluded from the analysis.
6 Descriptive results
The composition of our sample is represented in Table 1. Workers staying in the same job
and workers changing an employer do not di®er signi¯cantly. Especially in Germany, the
two groups look remarkably similar. However, in both countries stayers are, on average,
older than movers. Moreover, external movers are employed more often than stayers in
small ¯rms and in the sectors of trade, banking and ¯nance and less often than stayers
employed in the sector of `other services'. These di®erences between external movers and
stayers are more pronounced in the UK. Employer changes are more common for workers in
construction and trade and less common for workers in manufacturing. The same applies
for workers of small and medium sized ¯rms, as well as for white collar workers.
Large di®erences in human capital characteristics emerge between workers that change
jobs within the same ¯rm and the rest of the workers. There are more highly educated
among the workers that change jobs within the ¯rm than among the rest of the workers.
Work-related training also more often precedes an in-¯rm job change. This type of job
change is also more common for white collar workers and for large-¯rm employees. With
respect to sector di®erences, German in-¯rm movers are more usually employed in banking
and ¯nance, while their British colleagues are also more usually employed in banking and
¯nance, but also in `other services', and less usually employed in manufacturing, construc-
tion and trade.
Table 2 presents the proportion of job movers as well as the relative wage growth
between t and t+1 averaged over the years, with a breakdown according to the initial
position in the wage distribution. It shows that job mobility rates and the corresponding
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Table 1: Composition of the sample
(in percentages)
Germany UK
Stayers Movers Stayers Movers
External In-¯rm External In-¯rm
Married 82.2 79.8 84.4 75.6 63.5 67.1
Age (in years) 38.9 36.4 36.7 39.1 34.9 36.4
Education
Low 20.7 21.0 10.3 18.9 17.7 10.0
Medium 32.1 31.7 30.5 58.0 60.3 48.0
High 47.3 47.3 59.2 23.2 22.0 42.0
Traininga 34.0 30.9 48.2 3.5 4.7 11.6
Industry
Manufacturing 26.2 25.5 23.2 46.0 37.7 35.3
Energy 1.6 1.7 0.6 1.5 0.8 3.1
Mining 3.4 2.6 4.2 1.1 0.6 0.6
Agriculture 5.7 3.2 5.9 0.8 0.9 0.2
Construction 6.5 8.5 4.0 9.8 13.9 3.5
Trade 11.6 16.9 13.0 7.2 13.2 3.3
Transport 9.9 10.1 7.4 4.9 6.7 6.4
Banking, Finance 12.7 17.4 17.4 3.7 2.3 7.6
Other services 22.5 14.1 24.5 25.0 23.9 40.0
Firm size
Small ¯rms 26.3 35.6 17.7 13.6 29.3 2.9
Medium-sized ¯rms 25.9 28.3 24.7 26.0 33.6 12.4
Large ¯rms 47.8 36.1 57.6 60.4 37.1 84.7
Temporary contract 2.4 10.4 2.8 3.8 13.1 6.1
White collar 47.0 43.2 62.5 39.0 45.9 52.3
Apprenticeshipb 74.4 72.5 70.2
aThis refers to whether individuals have followed training the year prior to the survey.
bThis refers to whether individuals have ever followed an apprenticeship.
wage returns are higher in the liberal British labour market than in the regulated German
labour market. Furthermore, Table 2 indicates that in both countries, the low paid tend
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Table 2: Proportion of job movers and stayers, and associated relative wage growth
(in percentages)
UK Germany
Stayers Movers Stayers Movers
External In-¯rm External In-¯rm
Low paid
proportion 80.2 10.8 9.0 92.0 6.8 1.2
wage change 13 27 24 12 14 14
Medium
paid
proportion 80.1 7.3 12.6 93.4 4.6 2.0
wage change 5 8 10 4 6 8
High paid
proportion 78.4 6.3 15.2 92.3 4.7 3.1
wage change 0 1 3 1 2 1
Total
proportion 79.8 8.0 12.3 92.8 5.2 2.1
wage change 6 13 11 5 7 6
cases 12,968 1,300 1,999 11,404 639 258
The wage change refers to the year-to-year wage change as a proportion of the initial wage.
Note: A worker is low paid when his earnings belong to the lowest quartile of the hourly wage distribution,
and high paid when his earnings belong to the upper quartile of the wage distribution. The worker is middle
paid if his earnings are in the second or third quartile of the distribution.
to change employer more often than the high paid, while the high paid change jobs within
the ¯rm more often than the low paid. The average relative gain for the low paid, in
terms of year-to-year wage growth, is larger than for the high paid. On average, high-paid
workers do not experience any signi¯cant relative change in their wage. In the UK, the
low-paid workers that change a job experience an average increase of 27% in their wage,
while their high-paid colleagues only a 1% increase. The ¯gures for Germany are 14% and
2% respectively.
7 Results from the two-step estimation
First-step results: the job mobility equation
Table 3 shows the main results of the ¯rst-step regression for job mobility. The main
¯nding is that the probability of changing job varies across the di®erent parts of the wage
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Table 3: Random e®ects multinomial logit model for the job change
(robust standard error)
UK Germany
External movers Internal movers External movers Internal movers
Hours satisfaction
(reference category 1















value 7 -0.713¤¤¤ 0.204
















-0.195¤¤ 0.159¤¤ 0.000 -0.077
(0.086) (0.073) (0.087) (0.191)
high paid
-0.313¤¤¤ 0.012 0.033 0.248
(0.117) (0.091) (0.129) (0.239)
Constant
0.426 -2.208¤¤¤ 0.499 -5.783¤¤¤
(0.967) (0.753) (1.068) (2.069)
Random e®ect
0.911¤¤¤ -0.686¤¤¤ -0.536¤¤¤ 1.605¤¤¤
(0.068) (0.050) (0.094) (0.127)
Log likelihood -11,397.50 -5,281.75
Reference categories in brackets
Note: The following variables are included as controls in the regression: a dummy for married, age in years, age squared,
labour market experience in months, experience squared, education with respect to high school (low, high-school, tertiary),
a dummy for formal training in the previous year, the industry sector (sic level 1), the ¯rm size (small, medium and large
¯rms), the type of contract (permanent/temporary), tenure in months, yearly dummies, and the regional unemployment
rate. For Germany, we also included a dummy indicating whether the worker ever acquired apprenticeship quali¯cations.
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
distribution only in the UK. In this country, we ¯nd that the higher the position in the
distribution the lower the probability of changing employer. The probability of an internal
job change is higher for the middle part of the wage distribution than for the upper or lower
parts. Our exclusive variables (satisfaction for working hours and satisfaction with work
content in the UK and worry concerning job security in Germany) are strongly signi¯cant
for external mobility. These variables also have the expected e®ect: the more satis¯ed a
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worker is, the lower the probability of changing employer. For the UK, Table 3 shows only
the results for working hours satisfaction. The results for work content satisfaction are
similar. Despite the lack of signi¯cance of the exclusive variables in the in-¯rm mobility
equation, additional tests on the wage equation con¯rmed the adequacy of the instruments.4
The estimates for the rest of the covariates are not presented here. However, all the
estimates are consistent with previous ¯ndings. Correction for unobserved heterogeneity is
important in both countries: unobserved idiosyncratic characteristics, such as ability and
e®ort, a®ect the likelihood of a job transition. The estimated variance-covariance matrices
















The variance-covariance matrices show that the individual e®ects for external and in-
ternal job changes are negatively correlated in both countries. Therefore, in both countries
workers with a higher propensity for changing employer have a lower propensity for chang-
ing their job within the ¯rm.
Second-step results: wage mobility
Table 4 presents the results of the second step, the ¯xed-e®ects regression on wage growth.
We applied four versions of the model, namely ¯rst a simple ¯xed-e®ects regression, a
second one correcting for endogeneity, a third one correcting for the position in the wage
distribution but not endogeneity and ¯nally a model applying both corrections.
For both countries, in Models 1 and 2 the F-test for the individual e®ects does not reject
the null hypothesis that individual e®ects ui are jointly signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
4Speci¯cally, the Wald test for the overall signi¯cance of the exclusive variables rejects the null hypoth-
esis that these variables can be omitted from the regression. The full results for this regression can be
obtained from the author.
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Table 4: Second step regression - Fixed e®ects model for wage growth
(robust standard error)
UK Germany




0.042¤¤¤ 0.002 -0.018¤¤¤ -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Mills ratio for
in-¯rm job change
-0.114¤¤¤ 0.001 -0.023¤¤¤ 0.002
(0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Job change (reference category: no change)
External
job change
0.031¤¤¤ 0.018¤ 0.032¤¤¤ 0.031¤¤¤
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
In-¯rm
job change
0.025¤¤¤ 0.023¤¤¤ -0.008 -0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010)
Position in the distribution (reference category: low paid)
Medium paid
-0.260¤¤¤ -0.259¤¤¤ -0.217¤¤¤ -0.217¤¤¤
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
High paid
-0.521¤¤¤ -0.520¤¤¤ -0.441¤¤¤ -0.439¤¤¤
(0.541) (0.114) (0.089) (0.150)
Cross terms
Low paid * No change ref ref ref ref
Low paid *
External change
0.065¤¤¤ 0.067¤¤ 0.061¤¤¤ 0.062¤¤¤
(0.013) (0.020) (0.011) (0.014)
Low paid *
In-¯rm change
0.051¤¤¤ 0.054¤¤ -0.023 -0.017
(0.014) (0.018) (0.024) (0.025)
Medium paid * No change ref ref ref ref
Medium paid *
External change
-0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
Medium paid *
In-¯rm change
0.008 0.007 -0.004 -0.000
(0.008) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012)
High paid * No change ref ref ref ref
High paid *
External change
-0.033¤¤ -0.035 0.010 0.005
(0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.019)
High paid *
In-¯rm change
0.012 0.011 -0.024 -0.029¤
(0.011) (0.010) (0.017) (0.015)
Constant
0.801 0.412 0.245 0.235 0.346¤¤¤ 1.334¤¤¤ 0.200¤¤ 0.121
(0.817) (2.306) (0.736) (2.169) (0.106) (0.155) (0.094) (0.164)
R2 0.006 0.036 0.196 0.196 0.014 0.019 0.223 0.220
F-test (ui = 0) 0.62 0.72 1.36¤¤¤ 1.36¤¤¤ 0.57 0.58 1.30¤¤¤ 1.26¤¤¤
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
The list of the control variables is the same as in Table 3.
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Therefore, the OLS speci¯cation is to be preferred to these ¯xed-e®ects models. However,
the joint zero-hypothesis for the individual e®ects is rejected when we take into account
the position in the wage distribution (Models 3 and 4). The inclusion of the `position'
terms also increases the percentage of variance explained (in terms of the R2) from 3.6%
to 19.6% in the UK and from 1.9% to 22.3% in Germany.
The signi¯cance of the endogeneity terms depends on the model speci¯cation. The
t-tests for the inverse Mills ratios that provide a test for endogeneity (Vella & Verbeek,
1999) indicate that there is evidence in favor of endogeneity in Model 2 (see Table 4) but
not in Model 4, the model that corrects for the position in the wage distribution. This
¯nding suggests that the endogeneity of job mobility in the wage equation disappears when
we correct for the position in the wage distribution. Therefore, the discussion of the results
is based on Model 3 for both countries.
Our model contains two dummies for the position in the distribution and six cross-terms
between the position in the distribution and the type of job change (see equation 2). The
parameters corresponding to the dummies for the position in the distribution represent
the di®erence in wage growth of the low-paid worker with the middle-paid and high-paid
worker, respectively. The cross-terms represent the di®erence in the wage growth between
the relevant groups of movers and stayers. For example, the term `external change * high
paid' represents the di®erence in wage growth between the high-paid external mover and
the high-paid stayer. In other words, we estimate conditional e®ects with these cross-
terms. In both countries, the low-paid worker experiences, on average, a higher relative
wage growth than the high-paid worker, regardless of whether he changes job or not. This
di®erence is more pronounced in the UK than in Germany. Moreover, in both countries,
the low-paid external mover enjoys a higher wage growth than the low-paid stayer (6.5%
higher in the UK and 6.1% higher in Germany). The British low-paid in-¯rm mover also
experiences a 5.1% higher wage growth than the low-paid stayer. The wage growth of
the German low-paid in-¯rm mover does not di®er signi¯cantly from the wage growth of
a colleague who stays in the same job. A change of employer has a negative e®ect on
the wage growth of the British high-paid worker. The German high-paid external mover
does not di®er signi¯cantly from a colleague who stays in the same job. Finally, the wage
growth of the high-paid in-¯rm mover does not di®er signi¯cantly from the growth of the
high-paid stayer, in any of the two countries under scrutiny. If within-¯rm job changes were
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to refer only to promotions, this ¯nding would be surprising. However, in our sample, in-
¯rm job changes also include job changes at the same level and demotions.5 Furthermore,
as indicated by Baker et al. (1994), a wage gain from a job promotion might not take
immediate e®ect, but be delayed until a certain point in the future.
Figure 1: Wage changes across job transitions
In order to visualize the above-mentioned e®ects, in Figure 1 we present the estimated
wage change for the stayers, the external movers, the within-¯rm movers, and for the low-
paid, medium-paid and high-paid workers. The baseline of this ¯gure represents the wage
growth of a low paid stayer having average personal and job characteristics. Figure 1 shows
that, in both countries, the low-paid worker that changes employer enjoys a considerably
5For the UK, two-thirds of the internal job changes are related to promotions. For Germany, we cannot
distinguish promotions from other types of internal job changes.
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high relative wage increase. The British low-paid in-¯rm mover also enjoys a wage gain.
This gain is, however, smaller than the gain of a colleague who changes employer. The
rest of the e®ects are negligible. For the high-paid worker, we ¯nd that his average wage
growth is negative regardless of the type of job transition made.
Two words of caution should be added to the interpretation of these results. First, the
¯nding that the low-paid worker experiences, on average, a higher relative wage growth
than the high-paid worker should not be interpreted as an indication of decreasing earnings
inequality. This ¯nding is due to the fact that we are only observing part of the overall wage
mobility, as we have excluded workers moving in and out of paid employment. Secondly,
our wage measure is the hourly wage. The high-paid worker might derive more utility than
the low-paid worker from bonuses paid on a yearly basis or from fringe bene¯ts.
A sensitivity analysis: long-term e®ects
So far, we have only modelled year-to-year wage growth. However, wage gains from a
job change might not take immediate e®ect, but be delayed until a certain point in the
future (Blau & Kahn, 1981). Workers might accept the same, or even a lower, wage when
changing a job, if they expect a steeper wage growth in the new job.6 Therefore, it is
also necessary to compare the long-term wage growth of movers and stayers. For this
purpose, we repeat the same multivariate analysis by using the wage growth between t and
t + 3 as the dependent variable. In this analysis, our sample consists of workers that were
continuously employed from t until t +3 and did not change jobs between t +1 and t +3.
Thus, we compare workers that changed jobs between t and t + 1 and then remained in
this new job at least until t + 3, with workers that remained in the same job from t until
t + 3.
Table 5 shows the results of the second-step regression for the long-term wage growth.7
This table indicates that the main ¯nding remains the same. The low-paid worker that
changes employer experiences a larger wage growth than the low-paid stayer. An employer
change is also pro¯table for the middle-paid worker in the UK. The gains of the middle-paid
6A reservation wage lower than the current wage is not allowed by a job-search model, but is allowed
by a job-matching model.
7The results of the ¯rst step of the estimation are not presented, but are available on request from the
author.
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Table 5: Long-term e®ects - Fixed-e®ects model for wage growth
(robust standard error)
UK Germany




0.051¤¤¤ 0.008 -0.021¤¤¤ -0.009
(0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Mills ratio for
in-¯rm job change
-0.147¤¤¤ -0.024 -0.030¤¤¤ -0.007
(0.017) (0.015) (0.005) (0.004)
Job change (reference category: no change)
External
job change
0.050¤¤¤ 0.033¤¤¤ 0.026¤¤ 0.027¤
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
In-¯rm
job change
0.023¤¤¤ 0.019¤¤ 0.012 0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.019)
Position in the distribution (reference category: low paid)
Medium paid
-0.314¤¤¤ -0.300¤¤ -0.212¤¤¤ -0.212¤¤¤
(0.010) (0.013) (0.006) (0.007)
High paid
-0.595¤¤¤ -0.569¤¤ -0.428¤¤¤ -0.424¤¤¤
(0.014) (0.017) (0.009) (0.010)
Cross terms
Low paid * No change ref ref ref ref
Low paid *
External change
0.064¤¤¤ 0.059¤¤ 0.078¤¤¤ 0.083¤¤¤
(0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.024)
Low paid *
In-¯rm change
0.061¤¤¤ 0.065¤¤ -0.016 -0.016
(0.019) (0.022) (0.038) (0.038)
Medium paid * No change ref ref ref ref
Medium paid *
External change
0.027¤¤ 0.024¤ -0.031¤¤ -0.032¤¤
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
Medium paid *
In-¯rm change
0.016 0.016 0.022 0.024
(0.010) (0.011) (0.021) (0.024)
High paid * No change ref ref ref ref
High paid *
External change
-0.028 -0.033 0.010 0.013
(0.021) (0.022) (0.026) (0.027)
High paid *
In-¯rm change
-0.008 -0.013 -0.027 -0.026
(0.014) (0.015) (0.027) (0.027)
Constant
1.121 0.512 0.697 0.638 0.692¤¤¤ 0.547¤¤¤ 0.534¤¤¤ 0.478¤¤¤
(0.937) (5.400) (0.839) (4.926) (0.155) (0.186) (0.139) (0.167)
R2 0.015 0.057 0.231 0.231 0.034 0.041 0.235 0.235
* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
The list of the control variables is the same as in Table 3.
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British worker are, however, lower, than the gains of his low-paid colleague. By contrast,
in a three-year period, the German middle-paid external mover experiences a lower wage
growth compared to the middle-paid stayer. In both countries, a high-paid worker who
changes employer does not di®er with respect to wage growth from a colleague who stays
in the same job. Finally, as in the case of the year-to-year wage growth, a job change
within the same ¯rm is only pro¯table for the British low-paid worker. Therefore, we can
conclude that the main ¯ndings of our study indicate little sensitivity to the time period
for which the wage growth is observed.
8 Conclusions
Most studies on the e®ect of job mobility on wage growth implicitly assume that this e®ect
is the same at all wage levels. However, according to the theoretical model of Mortensen
(1986) and van den Berg (1992), both the hazard rate of changing a job and the di®erence
between the current wage and the reservation wage are decreasing functions of the current
wage.
These predictions were tested with a panel regression model, using data from the UK
and Germany. Since we had no information on the reservation wage, we approximated
the reservation wage with the wage in the new job. The prediction that the probability
of changing jobs is higher for the low-paid worker than for the high-paid worker is only
veri¯ed for the British external movers. In all other cases, no di®erences between the
low-paid workers and the high-paid workers emerge. By contrast, the ¯ndings on wage
growth are more in accordance with the expectations of the on-the-job search model. The
relative wage returns to external job changes are higher for the low-paid worker than for
the high-paid worker in both countries. On average, the low-paid external mover enjoys
a 6.5% in the UK and a 6.1% in Germany higher wage growth than the low-paid stayer.
The wage growth of the high-paid external mover is, on average, the same (in Germany) or
even lower (in the UK) than the wage growth of the high-paid stayer. This means that a
voluntary change of employer might be a good career move for the low-paid worker. With
respect to in-¯rm job changes, our results are in accordance with the predictions of the
on-the-job search model only in the UK. In the liberal UK labour market, the low-paid
worker enjoys a higher wage growth than his high-paid colleague by an in-¯rm job change.
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In Germany, however, an in-¯rm job change does not produce any gains or losses either
for the low-paid worker or for the high-paid workers.
The main ¯ndings of this study remain the same if we extend the period for which we
model wage growth, from one to three years. The only di®erence refers to the middle-paid
worker who derives long-term gains from an employer change in the UK, as opposed to
losses in Germany.
Caution should be taken with respect to the initial conditions problem. Several studies,
such as Stewart and Swa±eld (1999) and Cappellari and Jenkins (2004) suggest that
initial conditions are endogenous. Other studies, such as Ramos (2003) argue that initial
conditions are less of a problem. In this study, we have considered initial conditions (i.e.
the selection in the pay level) exogenous as controlling for endogeneity would complicate
our analysis. Further research can elaborate on the possible bias that initial conditions
may cause.
Country di®erences concerning the return to job change emerge in two points. Firstly,
the di®erences in wage returns from an external job change between low-paid, medium-
paid and high-paid workers are more pronounced in the UK than in Germany. In fact,
the ¯ndings for the UK are in accordance with the predictions of the on-the-job search
model, as wage returns to an external job change decrease with the position in the wage
distribution. Secondly, we found some evidence of positive returns to job changes in the
internal labour market only in the UK. We expected more returns to in-¯rm job changes
in the UK than in Germany. However, such country di®erences were found only for the
low-paid workers.
Further research can shed more light on the alternative explanations of why people
change jobs. Devine and Kiefer (1991) suggest that empirical ¯ndings on the e®ect of
job mobility on wage mobility are contradicting because of heterogeneity in the reasons
that drive individuals to change jobs. This is particularly important for the high-paid
workers. Our study suggests that changing jobs does not, on average, result in higher
hourly wages for this group of workers. These workers are likely to bene¯t more often from
bonus payments that are paid on a yearly basis, or from other forms of fringe bene¯ts.
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